Trade and business cycle co-movement: evidence from the EU by Bocola, Luigi
     TRADE AND BUSINESS CYCLE CO-MOVEMENT: EVIDENCE FROM     
         THE EU  
    
         Luigi Bocola∗
           Università degli Studi di Torino 
 
          
 
 
Abstract 
This paper studies empirically the determinants of business cycle co-
movement using a panel of European countries (1972-2004). We find 
that both policy convergence (in particular fiscal policy) and bilateral 
trade intensity are robust determinants of real co-movement in Europe, 
this confirming the seminal study by Frankel and Rose (1998), and 
more recent finding by Bergman (2004) and Darvas, Rose and Svapary 
(2005). Moreover ,once controlling for policy convergence, the effect of 
bilateral trade on business cycle co-movement weakens by a factor of 
36%-33%. This finding is interpreted as being evidence in favour of the 
recent claim by Gruben, Koo and Millis (2002) that Frankel and Rose 
econometric procedure suffers from omitted variables bias and 
endogeneity in the set of instruments.  
Keywords: Business Cycles Synchronization; Optimum Currency Area 
Criteria; European Monetary Union;    
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1 Introduction 
 
One of the main results of optimum currency area (OCA) theory is that 
countries whose frequency of idiosyncratic shocks is high are less suitable to take 
part to a fixed exchange rate regime1. The reason lies in the idea that joining a 
currency area limits the ability of countries to use national monetary policy to 
respond to country-specific shocks. This finding has been successively extended into 
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1 This idea has been proposed first by Mundell (1961) and has been further specified by Kenen (1969). 
The last 20 years have seen a growing body of articles in the area of OCA theory (see Tavlas, 1994). 
On the empirical implementation of the criteria of optimum currency area theory see Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen (1999). On the theoretical side, an excellent formalization is provided by Alesina and 
Barro (2002).  
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the environment of a monetary union2 and it has been one of the main analytical 
tools adopted by economists to gauge the economic suitability of the European 
monetary unification process. Relying on historical patterns of real co-movement, 
some authors3 have argued that the adoption of the single currency would create 
macroeconomic stability problems for the euro zone, especially because of the low 
degree of intra-European labor mobility and because of the absence of a federal risk 
sharing system. 
This view has been criticized by Frankel and Rose (1998). Applying a Lucas 
critique to the synchronicity criteria of OCA theory the two authors have argued that 
a fixed exchange rate regime may change dramatically the historical record of real 
co-movement: indeed, the boost in trade intensity between countries participating to 
the currency area may cause their cycles to be more and more similar. In other 
words, a currency area may be self-validating4, so that ex-ante valuations of its 
optimality would be redundant. As an empirical support of their idea, the two 
scholars have estimated a positive and large effect of bilateral trade intensity on the 
co-movement of cycles between 21 OECD countries. 
Frankel and Rose study have stimulated a growing body of empirical literature 
that has further investigated the determinants of business cycle co-movement. 
Perturbation of the basic model (see in particular Baxter and Kouparitsas, 2005) did 
not question the positive “trade effect” although its magnitude has been partially 
revisited (Imbs, 2003; Kose, Prasad and Terrones, 2003). Gruben, Koo and Millis 
(2002) have argued that omitted variables bias and endogeneity of the instruments 
adopted by Frankel and Rose may produce an overestimation of around 50%. Of 
course, a strong downward revision of the effect of bilateral trade on real co-
movement may cast some doubts on the economic relevance of this Lucas critique to 
the “synchronicity” criteria of OCA theory.  
                                                 
2 See De Grauwe (2000) for a two-country model that studies the efficiency of the common monetary 
policy in presence of asymmetries both in the occurrence of shocks and in the transmission 
mechanism. 
3 On the historical records of symmetry of shocks between European countries see Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen (1993). See Obstfeld and Peri (1998) for a discussion of the links between inter-regional 
labor mobility, asymmetric shocks and risk sharing in the European monetary union framework.   
4 This terminology is due to Corsetti and Pesanti (2002). In this work, the two authors have furnished 
a rationale for a Lucas critique to OCA criteria that differs from that of Frankel and Rose. 
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this paper extends the econometric specification of Frankel and Rose by 
considering the role of fiscal and monetary policy convergence on determining the 
international co-fluctuation of cycles. Using a panel of 14 European countries 
between 1972 and 2004 we find that countries having similar fiscal policies and 
similar real rate of return are likely to have more synchronized business cycles. 
Moreover, it is found that the impact of bilateral trade on real co-movement, 
although positive and highly statistically significant, is lower (between 48% and 
36%) than that estimated according to Frankel and Rose procedure. These results can 
be interpreted as being evidence in favour of Gruben, Koo and Millis claim. The 
paper is organized as follows: Sections 2 and 3 deal with Frankel and Rose 
endogeneity hypothesis and with a discussion of their estimation strategy. Section 4 
presents the results of our estimation and some sensitivity analysis. Section 5 
concludes, discussing the main policy implication for the European Monetary Union.   
 
2 Frankel and Rose’s endogeneity hypothesis 
 
A symmetric distribution of shocks has been identified as a crucial prerequisite 
for countries to form an optimal currency area. Frankel and Rose’s idea (1998) 
consists in considering this criterion endogenous to the constitution to the currency 
area itself, this rendering less relevant its ex-ante compliance. Their idea is based on 
two main conjectures: 
  
• Fixed exchange rate should promote trade between countries sharing 
the agreement; 
• Higher bilateral trade should result in more synchronized    
business cycles. 
 
Recent empirical studies based on the gravity model of international trade have 
pointed out that the effect of monetary unification on trade is positive and 
statistically significant, although its magnitude tends to be linked to the econometric 
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procedure adopted5. Nevertheless, as far as the sign of the effect is concerned, there 
is little ambiguity empirically that a common currency increases trade linkages 
between countries adopting it.  
More controversial from the point of view of economic theory seems the 
relation between trade intensity and business cycle synchronization. To formally 
present the channels trough which trade may affect real co-movement it is assumed, 
as in Frankel ad Rose (1998), that the growth rate of output of a country may be 
expressed as: 
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Where {ui} is the deviation of sector i growth rate of output from the average 
growth rate of output (v) at time t, {ai} is the share of sector i over total output and g 
is trend growth rate of GDP. Denoting by ỹt the de-trended growth rate of output at 
time t of a country we have6   
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Equation [2] tells us that the co-movement of business cycles between two 
countries, “Home” and “Foreign” (denoted by an asterisk) depends on the 
specialization pattern of the two economies, the variability of sector i cycle,  and the 
covariance between the two countries’ aggregate shocks. Imagining the two polar 
cases, equation [2] collapses to7  
                                                 
5 In particular, cross-sectional studies tend to estimate a “currency union effect” much higher than 
time-series studies (see Glick and Rose, 2002): given the underlying question (“how much does trade 
increase when two countries adopt a common currency?”) the time series approach is more suitable. 
Another econometric problem that can heavily affect estimation of the trade effect is that of reverse 
causality (see Personn, 2001). A time series approach which deals explicitly with the problem of 
reverse causality is Micco, Ordonez and Stein (2003), who have estimated a positive impact of the 
euro on intra-EMU trade between 4% and 23%.  
6 It is assumed that {ui} is distributed independently across both sectors and time and that {vi} is 
distributed independently of the sector specific shocks. This last assumption may be somewhat 
restrictive for countries characterized by a low extent of diversification, since industry specific shocks 
will have a strong effect on the aggregate state of the economy.  
7 The case of two highly specialized economies amount to assume 
jiaaa jjii a ≠∀==== −− 0101 ** . 
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When two countries are fully specialized in the production of two different 
goods while, in the case of two highly diversified economies, it becomes8:  
 
                             vv,22 σnσc*)y~,y~COV( +=                                               [4] 
 
c being the share that each industry has got on total output and n the number of 
industries in the two economies. 
As it is possible to see from equation [3] and [4] two countries with similar 
industrial structure tends to have more synchronous business cycles. Moreover, 
business cycle correlation is likely to be positively related to the extent of co-
movement of country-specific aggregate shocks. 
There are different channels through which bilateral trade intensity may affect 
the extent of business cycle synchronization between two countries.  
A first channel regards the cyclical behaviour of the trade balance. When a 
country is affected by a negative aggregate shock it will tend to import less and to 
export more with its trading partners: the economic relevance of such spill-over 
effects depends on the extent of bilateral trade9. Hence, there is little ambiguity that 
trade intensity positively affects the covariance of country specific aggregate shocks 
σv,v*. 
A second channel concerns the effect that trade has got on the industrial 
structure of a country. On the one hand, reduction of transaction costs may induce 
countries to specialize in sectors in which they have comparative advantages so that 
international trade should induce a divergence of {ai} between partners. Hence, the 
adoption of a single currency may in principle reduce the extent of similarity of the 
industrial structure between countries thus leading to more asynchronous business 
cycles, an idea that have been supported by Krugman (1993) for the case of the 
                                                 
8 In the case of two highly diversified economies we are assuming that jicaa ji ,* ∀== . For 
simplicity we also assume that 22 σσ =i i∀ .  
9 In particular, Prasad and Gable (1997) have pointed out the relevance of “export led” recoveries in 
the group of industrialized countries, the magnitude of this effect being proportional to the degree of 
openness of the economies. 
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European Monetary Unification process. On the other hand, the adoption of the 
common currency may enhance the similarity of {ai} between trading partners if the 
increase in trade takes place more within industries rather than between them. As a 
result, it is not possible a-priori to say if the adoption of a single currency induces 
more synchronous cycles: if inter-industry trade dominates over intra-industry trade, 
then specialization effects may produce less synchronous business cycles between 
countries taking part to a currency area.  
Frankel and Rose have tackled empirically the theoretically ambiguous effect 
of trade over business cycles co-movement. The two scholars have estimated, using a 
panel of 21 OECD countries, the following equation:      
  
                               Corr (ỹ,ỹ*)t = α + β TRADEt + εt                                     [5] 
 
Frankel and Rose’s hypothesis of endogeneity should be read as a hypothesis 
on the coefficient β. A positive β implies that the boost in bilateral trade should 
amplify the extent of co-movement of real variable between countries taking part to 
the monetary union. The size of the coefficient will then identify the economic 
relevance of this phenomenon: a large value of β will imply that real co-movement 
will sharply increase after the adoption of the single currency so that Frankel and 
Rose’s hypothesis will be confirmed. Instrumental variable (IV) estimation of 
equation [5] produces a positive and sizable effect of bilateral trade intensity over 
business cycle synchronization. This “trade effect” seems to be robust to the 
macroeconomic series used to measure cross-country real co-movement and to the 
methods adopted to isolate the trend component of GDP. In one of the benchmark 
estimations of the model, an increase in trade intensity by 1 standard deviation 
increases average real co-movement from 0.17 to 0.2775.  
 
3. A note on Frankel and Rose’s hypothesis 
 
The positive and large value of the coefficient β estimated by Frankel and Rose 
confirms the endogeneity hypothesis on the synchronicity criteria of OCA theory: 
countries joining a currency union are likely to experience an increase in trade vis-à-
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vis their partners and thus a (strong) increase in the synchronicity of cycles which 
will render ex post the common monetary policy more efficient. This result is not 
only important per se, but it brings about a number of implications regarding the 
economic policy institutional design of a currency area. As far as EMU is concerned, 
for instance, this finding indicates that fiscal policy rules may not be as costly as 
static OCA criteria based analysis may suggest. It is, thus, crucial to settle the 
robustness of Frankel and Rose’s findings. This section discuss the main econometric 
problems that may arise in the estimation of equation [5].   
 
3.1 Inconsistency of OLS 
 
The first doubt regards the inconsistency of Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
estimation of equation [5], a point that has been made by the two authors. There are 
two broad explanations for that. First, measurement error in the independent variable 
would let OLS estimation of the coefficient β to be bias towards 0. Secondly, 
bilateral trade intensity can be considered as endogenous to equation [5]. As noted by 
the authors, the poor fit of the regression would suggest a “true” model of the kind: 
 
                          Corr (ỹ,ỹ*)t = α + β TRADEt +  It 'γ+ εt                                 [6] 
 
Where It is a set of relevant variables that have been excluded from the 
analysis. A first reason for endogeneity arises here because “Trade” can act as a 
proxy for variables belonging to the set It. A potential candidate for being excluded 
from the regression and being correlated with “Trade” is monetary policy 
coordination. On the one hand, in fact, both theoretical and empirical (an exception 
is Clark and Van Wincoop, 2001) analyses have shown that coordination of 
monetary policy may have a positive impact on cycles’ synchronization10. On the 
other hand, it is reasonable to expect a positive relation between trade intensity and 
                                                 
10 Checchi (1989) has supported the idea that business cycle co-movement between G-7 countries 
have increased since the mid 70’s because of the process of convergence in real rates of return, due 
both to market development and to more similar monetary policies; a second reason, build on a 
“discipline argument”, has been sustained by Artis and Zhang (1995), who have suggested that 
monetary policy may itself be a source of shocks. Participation to a fixed exchange rate regime, 
producing more coordination, should reduce idiosyncratic behaviours and should enhance real co-
movement. As an evidence, the two authors reported the emergence of an “European business cycle” 
during the period of the European Monetary System (EMS). 
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monetary policy coordination, especially in the context of EU where incentives to 
coordinate policies during the 80s arose within the fixed exchange rate agreement of 
the European Monetary System. In fact, as OCA theory suggests, the benefits to 
participate to a fixed exchange rate regime are positively linked to the extent of 
bilateral trade so that we should expect participation to the EMS (and consequently 
coordination of monetary policies) being a positive function of bilateral trade 
linkages. Moreover, the EMS itself should have contributed to enhance trade 
intensity between countries part of the agreement. As a result, in the sample period 
considered, we should expect convergence in monetary policy to occur more 
between countries with intense trade relations: as section 4 will show, such claim 
will be confirmed in the data. Hence, the exclusion of a measure of monetary policy 
coordination from equation [5] would bias upward β. A second concern for 
endogeneity has been made by Imbs (2003) who has noted that countries with 
asynchronous cycles are likely to trade more than countries with higher real co-
movement. Simultaneity would thus underestimate the “trade effect”.  
 
 
Table 1: Sources of inconsistency of OLS estimation of β in eq. [5] 
Source of 
inconsistency 
Direction of the bias 
Measurement errors Underestimation of β 
 
Underestimation of β (Simultaneity)  
Endogeneity  Overestimation of β (exclusion of monetary policy 
coordination from equation [5]) 
 
 
Table 1 summarizes the main sources of inconsistency of OLS and the “likely” 
direction of the bias of the coefficient β when estimating equation [5] with OLS. 
Accordingly with these concerns, Frankel and Rose proposed IV estimation of [5], 
relying on a set of instruments borrowed from gravity models of international trade: 
geographic and cultural  proximity11. 
 
 
                                                 
11 Geographic proximity is measured by a dummy variable that take the value of 1 if two countries 
share the same border and by the distance (in miles) between the biggest cities between country pairs, 
while cultural proximity by a “common language” dummy variable. See the Appendix.  
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3.2 Are geography and language good instruments? 
 
The issue it is raised now concerns the validity of the set of instruments 
adopted in Frankel and Rose’s estimation of [5]. Although there are no doubts that 
bilateral trade is highly correlated with geographic and cultural factors, it is 
reasonable as well to assume that these factors affect international co-movement of 
business cycles not only trough the trade channel. Gruben, Koo and Millis (2002), 
whose argument is summarized in figure 1, first made this point. The idea goes as 
follows: geography and language proximity may affect cycle’s synchronization also 
trough other institutional and economic channels. Countries sharing the same border 
and the same culture (language) are likely to have higher factor mobility, more 
similar institutions and more coordinated policies, all things that, ceteris paribus, 
should positively influence cycle co-movement. If such claims would be confirmed 
in the data, it would cast doubts on the exogeneity assumption of the set of 
instruments proposed by Frankel and Rose.  
 
Figure 1: “Gruben,Koo and Millis hypothesis” 
Real Co-movement 
 
Trade 
Institutions, 
Co-ordination of 
monetary policies 
Factor 
mobility 
Geography and language 
fixed factors 
 
Source: Gruben, Koo and Millis (2003), pag. 21. A thick line indicates Frankel and Rose’s hypothesis.  
 
Gruben, Koo and Millis did not test explicitly this hypothesis. Rather, they 
have estimated a variant of equation [6] by OLS, including in It the set of instruments 
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adopted by Frankel and Rose. Their idea was to use geography and language to 
proxy for factor mobility and monetary policy coordination. Result of their 
estimation suggests a much lower “trade effect” (circa 50% smaller). In part, this 
finding is consistent with recent literature that has further investigated the relation 
between trade intensity and cycle synchronization12. Nonetheless, their econometric 
procedure may be questioned on two grounds: OLS estimation of equation [6] does 
not consider measurement errors and simultaneity that, as argued in the previous 
section, works to bias β towards 0; moreover, the use of proxies does not allow to 
distinguish among the determinants of real co-movement that has been made explicit 
in figure 1.   
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
 
This section deals with the relation between trade intensity and business cycle 
co-movement for a group of European countries. The aim is to provide an estimation 
of the “trade effect” robust to both the problems highlighted in the previous section. 
The work by Frankel and Rose and by Gruben, Koo and Millis is extended by 
explicitly considering: i) the process of monetary and financial convergence that has 
taken place in Europe from the mid 70’s onwards; ii) the role of fiscal policy 
coordination. Fiscal policy co-ordination, as well as monetary policy, may indeed 
have positive effects on business cycle co-movement: first, fiscal policy may be itself 
a source of shock for an economy so that its coordination, preventing idiosyncratic 
behaviours, should increase real co-movement; secondly, coordination of fiscal 
policies may increase business cycles correlation between countries when the 
geographic distribution of shocks is symmetric.  
The basic framework is that of equation [6]. The first subsection describe the 
data set used. Then the focus is on descriptive analysis of the main variable involved. 
Finally, estimation of parameters and sensitivity analysis are performed.    
                                                 
12 On cross-sectional studies see Baxter and Kouparitsas (2005) and Imbs (2003, 2004). In those 
studies the “trade effect” seems to extend also for developing countries, although Imbs finds that 
including a measure of cross-country similarity in the industrial structure lowers the estimates of the 
trade effect, this suggesting omitted variable bias in Frankel and Rose specification. In a panel data 
framework, Kose, Prasad and Terrones (2003) have found mixed evidence for a positive effect of 
trade on business cycle correlation and only for industrialized countries.   
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4.1 Description of the data set 
 
The analysis deals with countries belonging to the EU-1413 observed between 
1972 and 2004, the time span being split in five sub-samples14.  
Real co-movement is measured by cross-country correlation coefficient of 
cyclical GDP growth rate. For each country pair (i.e. France-Germany) it is observed 
one measure of real co-movement at each sub-period so that the maximum sample 
size is made by 455 observations. Business cycle is measured as the difference 
between actual and trend GDP growth rates, using two alternative filters: i) Baxter 
and King (1999) band pass filter (CICL1); ii) Hodrik and Prescott filter (CICL2). 
Although Baxter and King band-pass filter has become a standard in this literature, 
the adoption of the Hodrick and Prescott filter makes the analysis more comparable 
with those of Frankel and Rose. Moreover, alternative measurement of the business 
cycle may furnish some robustness checks to the results. 
Frankel and Rose’s measure of bilateral trade intensity has become a 
benchmark in the literature. Denoting by TRADEijt bilateral trade intensity between 
country i and country j in sub-period t we have: 
 
TRADEijt = (Xijt + Mijt) / (Xit + Mit + Xjt + Mjt) 
 
Xijt (Mijt) being total exportation (importation) from country j to country i and 
vice-versa. The higher the value of TRADEijt the higher will be trade intensity 
between country i and j at sub-period t.  
As it was argued before, fiscal and monetary policy similarities should 
positively influence real co-movement between country pairs. The problem, now, 
relates to their quantitative measurement. As far as monetary co-ordination is 
concerned, it is proposed the distance indicator: 
 
INTijt = ∑k |rik – rjk| / k 
 
                                                 
13 Countries are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK.  
14 The sub-periods are: 1) 1972-1978; 2) 1979-1985; 3) 1986-1992; 4) 1993-1999; 5) 2000-2004 
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r being short term real rate of return and k being the number of years in each 
sub-period. This indicator captures both the tendency towards financial integration 
and monetary policy convergence. The greater this indicator, the greater the spread 
of short term real rate of return between country i and country j.  
Measurement of fiscal policy co-ordination poses more problems. Studies that 
have seek to gauge the impact of fiscal policy convergence on real co-movement (i.e 
Clark and Van Wincoop; 2001, Bergman, 2004; Darvas, Rose and Swapàry, 2005) 
have all used various indicators based on elaboration of the fiscal balance. By the 
way, there are very good reasons to think that those measure may induce reverse 
causality15. Assume for instance that France and Germany are experiencing a boom 
of their economies. Holding fixed discretionary fiscal policies, the two countries will 
both face a reduction of their fiscal deficits due to the working of automatic 
stabilizer. What the econometrician will observe in such cases is that cycle 
synchronization between France and Germany takes place in presence of a co-
movement of fiscal deficits, this being the effect of the cycle itself. As a result of this 
reverse causality problem, OLS will tend to overestimate the impact of fiscal policy 
coordination on business cycles co-movement. Cyclically adjusted balances16 should 
solve this problem. Consistently, we propose three different measures of fiscal policy 
co-ordination: 
 
FISC(k)ijt = ∑k |Dik – Djk| / k 
 
where Dik is: a) fiscal balance (FISC1ijt); b) cyclically adjusted fiscal balance 
(FISC2ijt); c) fiscal impulse (FISC3ijt)17.  
A detailed description of data sources is in table 2 in the appendix.    
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 Darvas, Rose and Svapàry have made explicit this fact by instrumenting their fiscal policy 
convergence variable. 
16 To compute the cyclical component of net lending it is adopted the procedure in Giorno et al 
(1995): the elasticity of the fiscal balance is multiplied by the output gap by the output gap. The 
elasticities are from Van den Noord (2000) (subperiods 1-4) and from Giruard and André (2005) (sub-
period: 5). The output gap is the difference between actual and trend (H-P filtered) GDP growth rate. 
17 The “fiscal impulse” is defined to be the variation of the cyclically adjusted primary balance. For a 
description of this indicator see Blanchard (1990). 
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4.2 Descriptive analysis 
 
Summary statistics concerning the variables involved in the analysis are 
presented in the appendix. The first point worth mentioning concerns the evidence of 
an upward trend in business cycle co-movement. Table 3 shows a soft evidence for 
an increase in intra-European synchronization of cycles, although this path seems to 
depend on the variable we adopt: CICL2 median tends to increase monotonically 
over time while the same does not happen for CICL1. To investigate further this 
aspect figure 2 presents kernel density estimates in three sub-periods (1972-1978; 
1986-1992; 2000-2004). The graph displays evidence of bi-modal distribution, 
consistent with a core-periphery pattern already highlighted in the literature 
(Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1993; De Cecco and Perri, 1996). The evolution over 
time of the distribution also displays an interesting course: while the two modes seem 
to converge during the 80s there is a tendency for polarization in the late 90s, 
although the high co-movement mode displays a much greater fraction of the 
population.  
 
0
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-1 -.5 0 .5 1
real co-movement
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2000-2004
source: our elaboration on OECD
by subperiods
Figure 2: Cross-country distribution of real co-movement
 
 
As far as the other variables involved are concerned, their behaviour over time 
is somewhat expected: integration of financial markets and coordination of monetary 
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policy starting from the second oil price shock has led to an increase in the similarity 
of short term real rate of return between European countries, although this tendency 
has stopped in the last sub-period18; fiscal policy has converged much since the 
fourth sub-periods (which coincide with the convergence process induced by the 
Maastricht rules)19; bilateral trade intensity has on average increased throughout the 
sample.  
Table 4 and table 5 report simple correlation coefficients between the 
dependent variable and the regressors. For almost all the sub-periods, with the 
exception of the “Maastricht convergence process” (fourth sub-period), the signs are 
those expected: higher divergence of policies and lower trade intensity are associated 
with lower real co-movement. Moreover, it is interesting to notice (Table 6) that 
countries with higher bilateral trade linkage are characterized by more intense 
similarities of their real rate of returns, this confirming the conjectures of section 3.1. 
It is possible to notice also a (weaker) relation between trade and fiscal policy 
convergence20.  
 
4.3 Estimation  
 
Before presenting the baseline model, it is first run Frankel and Rose’s 
specification using our data. This test may help understanding if the different time 
horizon and the different sample of countries covered may alter results. Table 7 
compare estimation of β across the two sample: they look very similar, although both 
OLS and IV estimation adopting our data set display a greater trade effect on 
business cycle co-movement. So, the quantitative prediction of the model do not 
change much when considering only European countries: rising bilateral trade by one 
                                                 
18 This is entirely due to the increase in inflation differential which has characterized the euro area in 
the last years. On possible explanations of this phenomenon see Honohan and Lane (2003). 
19 This is true when measuring fiscal policy coordination with d1 (budget balance) and d2 (cyclically 
adjusted budget balance). When we adopt d3 (fiscal impulse), there is not evidence for convergence in 
sub-period 4 and 5. This is somewhat intuitive since the compliance with European fiscal policy rules 
concerns the public budget, rather than the primary balance.  
20This may be the result of a spurious relation. In particular, the political economy literature (see 
Persson and Tabellini, 1999) have pointed out that institutions matter in the conduction of national 
fiscal policy so that it is reasonable to expect countries with similar institution having more similar 
fiscal policies. On the other hand, similar institution may be the reflection of cultural linkages which 
positively affect bilateral trade. This may in principle explain the weak relation we have found 
between trade intensity and our indicator of fiscal policy convergence. 
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standard deviation leads to an increase of 0.1 in the average cross country business 
cycles correlation coefficient.               
 
Table 7: Measuring the trade effect adopting 
Frankel and Rose’s methodology 
Our data set  
CICL1 CICL2 
Frankel and 
Rose Data set 
OLS 
estimation of β
0.09 
(0.00) 
0.061 
(0.01) 
0.057 
(0.00) 
IV estimation 
of β 
0.104 
(0.00) 
0.095 
(0.00) 
0.087 
(0.00) 
R2 0.04 0.03 0.04 
Obs. 438 438 840 
                Note: Estimation of Equation [5]. In Frankel and Rose equation the dependent  
                      variable is the cross country correlation of GDP growth rate (de-trended adopting  
                      the H-P filter). P-value (robust) on a two tailed test that the coefficients equal  0. 
      
Our baseline equation is21: 
 
               Corr (ỹ,ỹ*)t = α + β TRADEjit +  γ INTijt+ δ FISCijt + εt          [7] 
 
Two alternative estimation techniques are proposed: OLS and IV22. Table 8 
and Table 9 present the benchmark result respectively for CICL1 and CICL2. 
Moreover, the robustness of benchmark estimates is controlled for: i) endogeneity of 
the policy variables; ii) sample period stability of the estimated parameters; iii) 
presence of outliers.   
 
4.3.1 Benchmark Estimates 
 
Results of benchmark estimation (Table 8; for CICL2 see Table 9 in the 
appendix) suggest three main points: 
First, fiscal policy convergence is associated with a greater degree of business 
cycle co-movement. This result applies irrespectively of the variable adopted to 
measure real co-movement (CICL1 and CICL2), and irrespectively of the variable 
adopted to measure convergence in fiscal policies (FISC1 and FISC3). Moreover, the 
effect appears also quantitatively relevant: a shift from the third to the first quartile of 
                                                 
21 We use natural logarithm of TRADE as in Frankel and Rose specification. 
22 Instruments are those employed by Frankel and Rose. See table 2 in the statistical annex. 
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the distribution of FISC1 should induce a 26% increase in cross-country correlation 
coefficient of cyclical GDP (CICL1) from its mean value.  
 
Table 8: Benchmark Estimation 
 CICL1 
(OLS) 
CICL1 
(OLS) 
CICL1 
(OLS) 
CICL1 
(IV) 
CICL1 
(IV) 
CICL1 
(IV) 
TRADE 0.074 
(0.00) 
0.09 
(0.00) 
0.09 
(0.00) 
0.062 
(0.04) 
0.059 
(0.04) 
0.073 
(0.01) 
FISC1 - 0.026 
(0.01) 
  -0.026 
(0.01) 
  
FISC2  -0.025 
(0.01) 
  -0.028 
(0.00) 
 
FISC3   -0.029 
(-0.02) 
  -0.032 
(0.01) 
INT -0.013 
(0.27) 
-0.005 
(0.65) 
-0.01 
(0.39) 
-0.016 
(0.33) 
-0.011 
(0.33) 
-0.016 
(0.22) 
R2 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.103 
F test 13.83 
(0.00) 
15.93 
(0.00) 
14.08 
(0.00) 
9.57 
(0.00) 
12.59 
(0.00) 
7.87 
(0.00) 
Hansen J test    3.6 
(0.16) 
3.9 
(0.13) 
3.1 
(0.20) 
Obs. 432 432 432 418 418 418 
Note: Based on estimation of equation [7]. CICL1 as dependent variable. Constant omitted. F test on the joint significance of 
the coefficients. Hansen J test on the exogeneity of instruments to eq. [7]  (p-value in parentheses). P-value (robust) on two 
tailed tests in parentheses. 
 
Second, a lower spread in real rate of return is associated with greater co-
movement of cycles: despite the fact that the coefficient is negative in all our 
estimates, most of the time it is not significantly different from zero at conventional 
statistical level, this casting doubts on the relevance of such effect.  
Finally, more intense trade linkages are associated with greater synchronization 
of cycles. This result holds for both CICL1 and CICL2 and for both estimation 
procedure, suggesting the robustness of Frankel and Rose findings. By the way, the 
size of this effect is lower than that estimated without controlling for policy 
coordination. This last result, if robust, would confirm Gruben et al. (2002) claim. 
We now consider some sensitivity checks for our benchmark estimates. 
 
4.3.2 Endogeneity of policies 
 
Policy makers partly target real variables when deciding policies, and the 
output gap is without doubt one of the variables they look at. Such observation 
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highlights a potential identification problem in our benchmark estimates: that of 
endogeneity. Consider two countries experiencing a boost of their economy: if policy 
maker adopt countercyclical fiscal policies, it should be observed an amelioration of 
the fiscal balance in both countries. As a result, business cycle correlation will be 
associated with a co-movement of the fiscal balance, although such result would not 
reflect causality of the latter. These considerations appear particularly relevant in the 
context of fiscal policies, where the working of automatic stabilizers may render this 
problem even worst (see Section 4.1). By the way, as far as fiscal policy is 
concerned, such problem may be attenuated by the following considerations: 
i. Existing empirical works on European countries point out the low 
sensitivity of fiscal policies to the output gap, especially in the first part of the 
sample period considered (Gali and Perotti, 2003);  
ii. It is possible to control for the automatic component of the fiscal 
balance by using as a fiscal coordination variable FISC2. As can be seen from 
Table 8, the estimated coefficients look very similar to that of FISC1. A 
possible explanation lies in the fact that our variables are averaged over seven 
years, this contributing to cancel out the effects of the cycle on our fiscal 
coordination variable.  
 
4.3.3 Sensitivity to the time span considered and to outliers23
 
A further check is to consider how the partial correlation change when varying 
the sample period adopted. We do this in the benchmark specification by excluding 
one sub-period at time (Table 10 and Table 11 in the appendix). As it is possible to 
see, the coefficient on FISC1 is surprisingly stable across sub-samples: when the 
dependent variable is CICL1, it fluctuates around -0.025, which is also the 
benchmark result. Moreover, its statistical significance is robust to this exercise. Also 
TRADE, to a less extent, displays a good degree of stability in both the point 
estimates and its statistical significance. The worst  performer is INT, which displays 
                                                 
23 Results are presented just for the correlation coefficient of cyclical GDP de-trended using the 
Baxter and King band-pass filter. Figures are very similar when using the Hodrick-Prescott filter and 
can be made available upon request. 
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an high degree of variability in both the point estimates and the 95% confidence 
bands.  
A final check consist to see whether results are robust to the presence of 
outliers. We identify outliers as observation (for both the dependent and independent 
variable) whose numerical values lies below (above) the first (third) quartile by a 
factor equal to three times the interquartile range (q3-q1). This amount to loose 10 
observations in our sample. Results are reported in Table 11. Controlling for outliers 
does not affect the robustness of the coefficients for bilateral trade and fiscal policy 
convergence. Rather, the coefficient on monetary policy convergence now become 
significantly different from zero at conventional levels. 
 
Table 11: Controlling for outliers 
 CICL1 
(OLS) 
CICL1 
(OLS) 
CICL1 
(OLS) 
CICL1 
(IV) 
CICL1 
(IV) 
CICL1 
(IV) 
TRADE 0.077 
(0.02) 
0.10 
(0.00) 
0.10 
(0.00) 
0.067 
(0.01) 
0.06 
(0.03) 
0.078 
(0.01) 
FISC1 - 0.025 
(0.01) 
  -0.024 
(0.02) 
  
FISC2  -0.023 
(0.00) 
  -0.026 
(0.00) 
 
FISC3   -0.028 
(-0.02) 
  -0.03 
(0.01) 
INT -0.025 
(0.05) 
-0.017 
(0.19) 
-0.02 
(0.09) 
-0.023 
(0.08) 
-0.022 
(0.09) 
-0.027 
(0.04) 
R2 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.10 
F test 15.82 
(0.00) 
17.77 
(0.00) 
16.21 
(0.00) 
11.41 
(0.00) 
11.92 
(0.00) 
9.78 
(0.00) 
Hansen J test    3.537 
(0.17) 
3.48 
(0.17) 
3.1 
(0.21) 
Obs. 422 408 408 408 408 418 
Note: Based on estimation of equation [7]. CICL1 as dependent variable. Constant omitted. F test on the joint significance of 
the coefficients. Hansen J test on the exogeneity of instruments to eq. [7]  (robust p-value in parentheses). P-value (robust) on 
two tailed tests in parentheses. 
 
4.4 Summary of Results 
 
The benchmark analysis and the robustness checks point out three main results: 
First, countries with similar fiscal policies tend to have more similar cycles. 
This result is robust to variation in the sample period considered. Moreover, although 
this point deserve further work, our discussion seems to suggest that the coefficient is 
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in large part reflecting the causal impact of fiscal policy convergence on real co-
movement. 
Second, countries with a low spread of short term real rate of return are 
characterized by a greater degree of synchronization when controlling for the 
presence of outliers. By the way, the endogeneity problems highlighted in section 
4.3.2, the low significance of the coefficients when working with the full sample and 
the low extent of sub-sample stability of the parameters cast doubts on the robustness 
of these results. 
Third, greater trade intensity boost real co-movement this confirming the claim 
by Frankel and Rose and further studies testing their hypothesis. Such effect appear 
robust even when controlling for policy coordination. In this latter case, by the way, 
the size of the effect weakens, this confirming Gruben et al (2002) claim. Figure 4 
presents weighted average of our benchmark estimates of the trade effect with those 
estimated with Frankel and Rose procedure.  
 
Figure 4: Comparison between our benchmark 
results and Frankel and Rose methodology
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                                        Note: Weighted average (robust t-statistic as weights) of β estimated according  
                                        to the different specifications. 
 
 
The striking result concern the fact that benchmark IV estimates is 33% lower 
than that estimated with Frankel and Rose procedure. To show why this is the case, 
consider the analytic expression for the IV coefficient of β from equation [5]. 
 
                                  
)ˆ(
)ˆ,(~
DEATRVAR
DEATRyCOV
IV =β                                                [a] 
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DEATR ˆ being the vector of fitted values from the first stage regression, and y 
being our dependent variable. Assuming the true model is, instead, represented by [7] 
and assuming orthogonality between TRADE and the disturbance in equation [7], we 
can express [a] as: 
 
)ˆ(
)ˆ,(
)ˆ(
)ˆ,(
)ˆ(
)ˆ,(~
DEATRVAR
DEATRINTCOV
DEATRVAR
DEATRFISCCOV
DEATRVAR
DEATRTRADECOV
IV γδββ ++=         [b] 
 
The sample correlation of TRÂDE and our policy variables is given in table 12. 
As can be seen, the sample moments seems to confirm the idea put forth by Gruben, 
Koo and Millis that countries sharing the same border and the same culture 
(language) are characterized by a more intense coordination of their policies. The 
exclusion of the policy variables from [5] is, thus, expected to produce an 
overestimation of β in Frankel and Rose’s specification, since: 
 
                                           kpIV +⎯→⎯ ββ~                       0>k                     [c] 
 
Table 12: Correlation between regressors and TRẬDE 
 TRẬDE 
 (fitted value from 1st stage regression) 
FISC1 -0.22 
FISC2 -0.225 
FISC3 -0.10 
INT -0.19 
              
 
5  Conclusions: policy implication for EMU 
 
A symmetric distribution of shocks is one of the criteria that the theory 
developed by Mundell (1961) identifies as being a determinant for the economic 
success of a currency area. Building a common monetary policy may be inefficient 
and produce macroeconomic stability problems when countries taking part to the 
arrangement are characterized by a low extent of cycle synchronization. This view 
has been criticized by Frankel and Rose, who have argued that this criterion should 
 20
be considered as endogenous to the construction of the currency area: fixed exchange 
rate should, in fact, stimulate intra-union trade intensity thus contributing to more 
synchronous cycles and to a better functioning of the common monetary policy. In 
this paper it has been extended the econometric approach adopted by Frankel and 
Rose (1998) to support their hypothesis. Building on the considerations presented by 
Gruben, Koo and Millis (2002) we have explicitly taken into account the role of 
policies’ convergence on real co-movement. Our empirical results suggest three main 
points:  
 
i. Coordination of policies seems to help cycle synchronization: countries that 
have got similar fiscal policy seem to co-move more than countries with 
idiosyncratic policies, this result being robust to a number of sensitivity 
checks. Moreover, we have also found a weak evidence that convergence in 
short term real interest rates has been beneficial for intra-European co-
movement of business cycles, especially when controlling for the presence 
of outliers. Further research should address the problem of endogeneity of 
policies in this framework before the robustness of our point estimates can 
be settled;  
ii. Bilateral trade intensity positively affects business cycles co-movement, 
this confirming Frankel and Rose’s claim. In terms of the discussion in 
section 2, it implies that “specialization” induced by inter-industry trade is 
not so strong in Europe to overcome intra-industry trade and spill-over 
effects that positively influence cycle synchronization. Nonetheless, the size 
of this “trade effect” appears to be smaller than that estimated adopting 
Frankel and Rose’s methodology (on average between 36% and 33%);  
iii. European data support the idea put forth by Gruben, Koo and Millis on the 
endogeneity of the set of instruments proposed by Frankel and Rose. 
Countries being geographically close and sharing the same language tends 
to have more similar fiscal and monetary policies. This furnishes an 
explanation of the discrepancies between our estimates of the “trade effect” 
and the one implied by Frankel and Rose’s procedure. 
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These findings suggest a number of implications for the functioning of the 
European Monetary Union (EMU). 
As a first point, it can be supported the idea that the pattern of cycle co-
movement between European countries will not change much trough the trade 
channel as a result of the adoption of the euro. Although we do not provide a formal 
proof of that, there are two clues concerning this outcome. On the one hand, recent 
empirical estimations of the impact of the euro on intra-EMU trade have not 
identified a dramatic boost after 1998. Micco, Ordonez and Stein (2003) have 
quantified this effect to be 8,9% while De Nardis and Vicarelli (2003) have estimated 
a positive impact of the euro of the order of 6%. Those results are far from the 65% 
estimated by Glick and Rose (2002) for other experiments of monetary unification 
(including developing countries as well): these discrepancies may be caused by the 
fact that Europe is already a very integrated area in the goods market, so that the 
adoption of the euro had a minor impact on intra-EMU trade. On the other hand, our 
estimation of the impact of trade on business cycle co-movement suggests that a 
move from the median to the 75th percentile in bilateral trade intensity (which 
correspond to an increase in bilateral trade intensity by 150%) increase (average) 
cycle’s synchronization by only 15%, far from the 50% implied by Frankel and Rose 
estimation. Together, these two factors may let us conjecture that Frankel and Rose 
hypothesis is likely to operate in Europe only in the very long run.  
Another implication of the analysis is that fiscal policy rule may be to some 
extent beneficial for the macroeconomic policy framework of EMU. Early studies on 
the rationales of the Maastricht treaty and of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) 
(Lamfalussy, 1989; Bovemberg, Kremer and Masson, 1991; Buiter, Corsetti and 
Roubini, 1993; Artis and Winckler, 1999) have identified financial stability and ECB 
credibility as the main benefits for the adoption of fiscal policy rules. We argue that 
fiscal policy rules may help also the stabilizing effort of the European Central Bank: 
to the extent that the SGP prevents idiosyncratic behaviour in the conduction of 
domestic fiscal policies, we should observe more synchronous cycles between 
European countries and thus a more efficient common monetary policy. This 
conclusion, nonetheless, need to be weighted with the fact that domestic fiscal 
policies in Europe have become a more important buffer for negative shocks than in 
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the past, especially for countries whose internal needs will not be represented by the 
ECB policy: the adoption of the single currency, the absence of a federal risk sharing 
arrangement (e.g. Farina and Tamborini, 2002) and the lack of intra-European labor 
mobility all point in the direction of national fiscal policies to be one of the few 
instruments in the hand of European countries to counteract idiosyncratic movements 
in real variables. In absence of a central political authority, the solution of this trade-
off between “European rules” and “national discretion” represents one of the crucial 
point Europe should face to improve its short run macroeconomic policy frame and 
to increase the economic success of the euro.         
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Statistical Annex 
 
 
Table 2: The Data set 
Variable Description Source Missing 
Observations 
Note 
 
CICL1 
Cross country 
correlation coefficient 
of cyclical GDP 
growth rate (H-P 
filtered) 
 
 
// 
 
 
// 
 
CICL2 
Cross country 
correlation coefficient 
of cyclical GDP 
growth rate (Baxter 
and King band pass 
filtered) 
 
OECD 
(Retrospective 
Statistics (2002) 
and OECD 
Economic 
outlook 
 
 
 
// 
 
 
// 
 
 
FISC1 
OECD 
(Retrospective 
statistics, 2002 
and OECD 
economic 
outlook 
 
 
// 
 
 
// 
 
FISC2 
 
 
 
FISC3 
 
 
Our elaboration 
on OECD 
(Retrospective 
statistics, 2002 
and OECD 
economic 
outlook, various 
years) 
 
 
 
Portugal 
(1972-1978) 
 
 
See note 16 
in the text 
for the 
computation 
of the 
cyclical 
component 
of fiscal 
balance 
 
 
INT 
 
AMECO 
database (EU-
Commission) 
 
 
Greece and Sweden 
(1972-1978) 
Private 
consumption 
deflator in 
computing 
short term 
real rate of 
return   
 
TRADE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
See section 
4.1  
 
 
ITCS database, 
OECD  
 Data on 
Austria are 
from IMF 
direction of 
Trade 
statistics 
Ling Dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1 if 
the two countries 
share the same 
language 
 
Frankel and 
Rose data-set 
  
  Lndist Natural logarithm of 
the distance (in miles) 
between the two 
“economic” capital of 
the country pair 
 
Frankel and 
Rose data-set 
  
  
 
 
 
Instruments 
Adjacent Dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1 if 
the two countries 
share the same 
language 
 
Frankel and 
Rose data-set 
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Table 3: Summary statistics, by sub-period 
 1972-1978 1979-1985 1986-1992 1993-1999 2000-2004  1972-2004 
P25 0.013 -0.013 -0.0262 0.21 0.33 0.093 
P50 0.48 0.29 0.31 0.63 0.71 0.47 
P75 0.76 0.61 0.54 0.77 0.88 0.74 
Mean 0.38 0.25 0.27 0.47 0.47 0.37 
CICL1 
cv 1.15 1.50 1.23 0.92 1.16 1.19 
P25 0.012 0.15 0.13 0.31 -0.03 0.11 
P50 0.42 0.45 0.48 0.62 0.67 0.51 
P75 0.68 0.60 0.67 0.79 0.865 0.74 
Mean 0.34 0.38 0.41 0.49 0.41 0.40 
CICL2 
Cv 1.18 0.87 0.82 0.77 1.35 1.01 
P25 2.03 2.54 2.60 1.65 1.9 2.07 
P50 3.75 4.10 4.47 2.48 2.72 3.33 
P75 5.9 7.04 7.47 4.1 4.2 5.72 
Mean 4.27 4.97 5.38 3.19 3.1 4.15 
FISC1 
Cv 0.64 0.61 0.61 0.62 0.57 0.67 
P25 2.14 2.57 2.79 1.62 1.89 2.08 
P50 3.8 4.13 4.72 2.32 2.71 3.2 
P75 6.08 6.9 7.33 3.54 4.25 5.57 
Mean 4.48 4.9 5.37 2.62 3.1 4.11 
FISC2 
Cv 0.63 0.59 0.6 0.5 0.59 0.67 
P25 1.64 2.16 1.99 1.89 1.38 1.75 
P50 2.94 3.14 2.85 2.95 1.98 2.82 
P75 4.50 4.02 4.05 4.19 2.9 4.05 
Mean 3.27 3.22 3.24 3.2 2.34 3.05 
FISC3 
Cv 0.62 0.42 0.47 0.51 0.55 0.53 
P25 0.003 0.003 0.0046 0.0048 0.0039 0.0042 
P50 0.007 0.006 0.0076 0.008 0.006 0.007 
P75 0.016 0.017 0.021 0.02 0.017 0.018 
Mean 0.013 0.014 0.016 0.0164 0.015 0.0152 
TRADE 
Cv 1.25 1.23 1.10 1.05 1.14 1.146 
P25 2.9 2.3 1.5 1.15 0.76 1.35 
P50 3.92 2.9 2.21 1.55 1.182 2 
P75 5.4 4 3.07 2.12 1.8 3.27 
Mean 4.01 3.53 2.4 1.4 2 2.58 
INT 
Cv 0.42 0.56 0.49 0.74 0.56 0.67 
 Note: p25, p50 and p75 are, respectively, the 25th, the median and the 75th percentile; cv is the     
 coefficient of variation. 
 
 
 
Table 4: Correlation among real co-movement (CICL1) 
and regressors 
 1972-1978 1979-1985 1986-1992 1993-1999 2000-2004 1972-2004 
TRADE 0.24  0.06 0.20     -0.03 0.39  0.20 
FISC1 -0.61 -0.19 0.02  0.05 -0.28 -0.29 
FISC2 -0.67 -0.22 0.005      0.05 -0.25 -0.29 
FISC3 -0.67 -0.20 -0.14 -0.18 -0.04 -0.25 
INT 0.14 -0.17 -0.14  0.13 -0.10 -0.16 
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 Table 5: Correlation among real co-movement (CICL2) 
and regressors 
 1972-1978 1979-1985 1986-1992 1993-1999 2000-2004 1972-2004 
TRADE 0.37  0.02 0.17 -0.03 0.24  0.19 
FISC1 -0.21 -0.12 -0.06 0.19 -0.13 -0.13 
FISC2 -0.20 -0.16 -0.09 0.12 -0.15 -0.16 
FISC3 -0.32 -0.15 -0.33 0.04 -0.04 -0.12 
INT -0.002 -0.33 -0.1 0.13 -0.24 -0.15 
 
 
Table 6: Correlation between regressors 
 TRADE FISC1 FISC2 FISC3 INT 
TRADE * * * * * 
FISC1 -0.19 * * * * 
FISC2 -0.20 0.95 * * * 
FISC3 -0.12 0.50 0.52 * * 
INT -0.25 0.24 0.25 0.1320 * 
 
 
Table 9: Benchmark Estimation 
 CICL2 
(OLS) 
CICL2 
(OLS) 
CICL2 
(OLS) 
CICL2 
(IV) 
CICL2 
(IV) 
CICL2 
(IV) 
TRADE 0.043 
(0.02) 
0.05 
(0.00) 
0.059 
(0.00) 
0.069 
(0.01) 
0.06 
(0.04) 
0.071 
(0.01) 
FISC1 - 0.013 
(0.06) 
  -0.01 
(0.17) 
  
FISC2  -0.014 
(0.05) 
  -0.013 
(0.07) 
 
FISC3   -0.021 
(-0.07) 
  -0.02 
(0.09) 
INT -0.021 
(0.06) 
-0.017 
(0.15) 
-0.02 
(0.09) 
-0.016 
(0.18) 
-0.015 
(0.21) 
-0.017 
(0.15) 
R2 0.05 0.05 0.5 0.5 0.05 0.5 
F test 6.81 
(0.00) 
7.65 
(0.00) 
7.43 
(0.00) 
6.75 
(0.00) 
7 
(0.00) 
6.75 
(0.00) 
Hansen J test    4.06 
(0.13) 
3.9 
(0.13) 
3.7 
(0.15) 
Obs. 432 432 432 418 418 418 
Note: Based on estimation of equation [7]. CICL2 as dependent variable. Constant omitted. F test on the joint significance of 
the coefficients. Hansen J test on the exogeneity of instruments to eq. [7]  (p-value in parentheses). P-value (robust) on two 
tailed tests in parentheses. 
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Table 10: Estimation of equation [7] by sub-periods (CICL1) 
No 1st 
subperiod 
No 2nd 
subperiod 
No 3rd 
subperiod 
No 4th 
subperiod 
No 5th 
subperiod 
 
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
TRADE 0.079 
(0.01) 
0.058 
(0.07) 
0.11 
(0.00) 
0.08 
(0.02) 
0.1 
(0.00) 
0.05 
(0.1) 
  0.12 
(0.00) 
0.09 
(0.01) 
0.06 
(0.03) 
0.014 
(0.65) 
FISC2 -0.02 
(0.00) 
-0.02 
(0.00) 
-0.03 
(0.00) 
-0.03 
(0.00) 
-0.03 
(0.00) 
-0.03 
(0.00) 
-0.01 
(0.04) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.022 
(0.00) 
-0.025 
(0.00) 
INT -0.02 
(0.1) 
-0.02 
(0.09) 
0.021 
(0.2) 
0.01 
(0.3) 
-0.05 
(0.66) 
-0.01 
(0.36) 
-0.005 
(0.7) 
-0.009 
(0.5) 
-0.008 
(0.5 
-0.018 
(0.17) 
OBS. 363 327 328 327 327 
Note: This table reports the estimated coefficients of regression [7] excluding one sub-period at time. 
The dependent variable is CICL1. Constant not reported. Robust p-value (two-tailed) in parentheses. 
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